Autoritäre Schatten in der Europäischen Union. Der Fall Österreich
Das vorliegende Paper besteht aus zwei Teilen. Der erste Teil ist eine Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse eines mehr als ein Jahr laufenden Projekts, welches das Abstimmungsverhalten von Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlaments hinsichtlich außenpolitischer Fragen beobachtete, um ihre Anfälligkeit für autoritäre Einflüsse zu ermitteln. Das Projekt wurde während der derzeitigen neunten Legislaturperiode (2019-2024) durchgeführt. Ein besonderes Augenmerk lag dabei auf sieben mittel- und südosteuropäischen Staaten (Tschechien, Ungarn, Polen, Slowakei, Österreich, Rumänien und Bulgarien). Für mehr Information zum Projekt besuchen Sie https://politicalcapital.hu/authoritarian_shadows_in_the_eu/
Der zweite Teil ist eine Fallstudie, die sich mit dem Abstimmungsverhalten der österreichischen Mitglieder des EU-Parlaments (ebenfalls während dessen neunter Legislaturperiode) in außenpolitischen Fragen beschäftigt.
Coronaviral propaganda against Europe
The CDI investigates how authoritarian regimes use the Covid-19 pandemic to advance their illiberal goals in Europe.
Hungary: the Success Story of Chinese Mask Diplomacy
Patrik Szicherle and Péter Krekó show how the promotion of the Chinese medical “gifts” can help Hungarian political elites to sell their pro-China policies to the public.
Event: Russia’s Annexation of Crimea Seven Years After: Why It Happened and What It Means for Europe
Andreas Umland, Research Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and co-founder of the Centre for Democratic Integrity
Margarita Akhvlediani, Managing Director at the JAMnews media platform
Natalia Gumenyuk, journalist, co-founder of the Public Interest Journalism Lab
Martin Kragh, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
Concept and moderation
Anton Shekhovtsov, Director and founder of the Centre for Democratic Integrity
Event: How Russian Media Targeting International Audiences Spread Conspiracy Theories
Conspiracy theories are not mere myths. Backed by state institutions, they become potent instruments of political or even geopolitical struggle. This is the case in Vladimir Putin’s Russia: state-controlled media targeting the international audiences, like RT (former Russia Today), have promoted conspiracy theories aimed at discrediting and undermining liberal democratic societies. What is the place of the anti-Western conspiracy theories in contemporary Russia? Do these theories reflect the official political line? Which challenges do conspiracy theories pose to the international media?
Dr. Ilya Yablokov, Lecturer in Russian media and politics, University of Leeds, UK.
Dr. Precious Chatterje-Doody, Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, Open University, UK.
Concept and Moderation
Dr. Anton Shekhovtsov, external Lecturer, University of Vienna, Austria. Founder of the CDI.
Event: The Geopolitical Impact of Nord Stream 2.0 on European Energy Security
The Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, the Centre for Democratic Integrity, and the Vienna School of International Studies are pleased to invite to a panel discussion on:
The Geopolitical Impact of Nord Stream 2.0 on European Energy Security
Prof. Dr. Johannes Pollak
Director at Webster University
Dr. Andreas Umland
Senior Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation (Kiev, Ukraine)
Ana Otilia Nuțu, MA
Policy Analyst on energy and infrastructure at Expert Forum (Bucharest, Romania)
Dr. Anton Shekhovtsov
External Lecturer at the University of Vienna (Vienna, Austria)
Dr. Werner Fasslabend
President of AIES and former Minister of Defence of Austria
Wednesday, February 26, 2020 18:00 h
Diplomatische Akademie Wien
Russian Interference, and Where to Find It
A report by the European Platform for Democratic Elections considers elections in France, Norway, Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary and Sweden in in 2017-2018 and identifies different factors that influence the occurrence of Russian interference in European elections.
Each case of Russian interference in European elections is a juncture of unique conditions that derive from various factors reflecting realities in Western nations and Russia. When assessing Russian interference, one needs to consider whether Putin’s regime is satisfied with the prevailing political attitudes towards Russia in a European country in question, whether there are political forces that are significant enough and are ready to cooperate with Russian pro-Kremlin actors, whether meddling in the elections in favour of particular political forces clashes with other interests of Putin’s regime, whether Russia has relevant human and structural resources to interfere in the electoral process, and whether political culture is conducive to Russian influence.
Because the Kremlin was not happy with the projected outcomes of the electoral processes, Russian state and pro-Kremlin non-state actors interfered in the 2017 presidential elections in France and, to a lesser extent, in the 2017 parliamentary elections in Germany. However, Moscow did not have to interfere in the elections in Austria, Italy, and Hungary as the Kremlin was satisfied with the political situations in those countries. At the same time, while Moscow was not satisfied either with Oslo’s or Stockholm’s attitudes towards Putin’s Russia, it could not interfere in their elections because their political culture did not allow pro-Kremlin actors to win over any significant political forces.